Enhancing credibility of digital evidence through provenance-based incident response handling by Englbrecht, Ludwig et al.
Enhancing credibility of digital evidence through
provenance-based incident response handling
Ludwig Englbrecht
Department of Information Systems, University of
Regensburg
Regensburg, Germany
ludwig.englbrecht@ur.de
Gregor Langner
Faculty of Computer Science, Research Group Multimedia
Information Systems, University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria
gregor.langner@univie.ac.at
Günther Pernul
Department of Information Systems, University of
Regensburg
Regensburg, Germany
guenther.pernul@ur.de
Gerald Quirchmayr
Faculty of Computer Science, Research Group Multimedia
Information Systems, University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria
gerald.quirchmayr@univie.ac.at
ABSTRACT
Digital forensics are becoming increasingly important for the in-
vestigation of computer-related crimes, white-collar crimes and
massive hacker attacks. After an incident has been detected an
appropriate incident response is usually initiated with the aim to
mitigate the attack and ensure the recovery of the IT systems. Digi-
tal Forensics pursues the goal of acquiring evidence that will stand
up in court for sentencing and sometimes opposes contradicting
objectives of incident response approaches. The concept presented
here provides a solution to strengthen the credibility of digital ev-
idence during actions related to incident response. It adapts an
approach for data provenance to accurately track the transforma-
tion of digital evidence. For this purpose, the affected system and
the incident response systems are equipped with a whole system
data provenance capturing mechanism and then data provenance is
captured simultaneously during an incident response. Context infor-
mation about the incident response is also documented. An adapted
algorithm for sub-graph detection is used to identify similarities
between two provenance graphs. By applying the proposed concept
to a use case, the advantages are demonstrated and possibilities for
further development are presented.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing→ Computer forensics; Evidence collec-
tion, storage and analysis; • Security and privacy → Intrusion/
anomaly detection and malware mitigation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The detection of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) can be very
difficult since this type of attack are specifically tailored to certain
companies or organisations. APTs are usually divided into three
phases [8]. In the first phase, information about a penetration of
the system is collected. Different techniques such as the evaluation
of the target via social engineering or active vulnerability scan-
ning are used. In the second phase, the actual infection of a system
is prepared via waterholes or spear-phishing. In the third phase,
data is extracted from the target system and traces are wiped out.
Therefore information about known APTs allow the conclusion
that the perpetrators have large financial resources as well as tech-
nical understanding. Securing traces in these situations is difficult,
because the attack is usually only detected when damage has al-
ready occurred. The analysis of log files over a longer period of
time in combination with Indicators of Compromise (IOC) is crucial
to initiate and perform an effective incident response (IR).
Before a case can be investigated using Digital Forensics (DF), the
process of an IR must be initiated. Different process models have
already been defined for this purpose. In principle, the following
seven components can be found in an IR approach: pre-incident
preparation, detection of incidents, initial response, formulate response
strategy, investigate the incident, reporting and resolution [15]. This
ensures a goal-oriented progression, starting from a careful prepa-
ration to countering the attack until the incident is cleared up.
A DF investigation can also be initiated before an incident occurred.
According to [7] the IR deals mainly with the immediate response
and pursues a timely recovery of the systems. DF on the other
hand, stretches from incident to normal operation and has its main
objective in acquiring useful digital evidence. Since both aspects
have different objectives, the two activities are inevitably in a con-
flict with each other. If evidence has been modified by IR actions,
there is a significant risk that the evidence cannot be used for law
enforcement purposes.
This problem has been recognised and guidelines for the integration
of DF techniques into the IR process were developed [10]. Neverthe-
less, this integration has not yet been fully accomplished. It is still a
field of ongoing research work. Even if an organisation invests a lot
of effort in the area of IT security, its maturity level for a possible
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DF investigation may not be sufficient [5]. In most cases, evidence
is corrupted due to incorrect procedures within the IR procedures.
Another challenge is the clear differentiation between the attack
pattern and the IR measures.
The work presented in this paper aims to fill the gaps between
protecting evidence, while recovering the system. A concept from
the area of whole-system data provenance is used to collect IR data
in order to distinguish the processes of the response team from the
activities of an ongoing attack for a DF investigation. This concept
can be used for a live forensic in order to increase the credibility
and consequently the admissibility of acquired digital traces during
an IR in court. The concept proposed here is presented as a preven-
tive measure and can be assigned to the area of Digital Forensic
Readiness (DFR). In particular, our concept ensures that traces of
the attack have not been altered by IR measures.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present the
basics of DF in IR handling and whole-system data provenance.
A conceptual presentation of the intended approach is presented
in Section 3. In Section 4, a prototypical implementation of the
concept is shown. The application of the model to a use case is
described in Section 5 and the discussion of the results is provided
in Section 6. Section 7 provides a summary of the proposed concept
and an outlook on future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Ensuring and increasing the admissibility of digital traces in court
is a constant endeavour in science and practice. Especially the inap-
propriate handling of the data as well as the data storage medium
during a DF investigation, can lead to the dismissal of decisive
evidence from law enforcement proceedings. It is common for en-
terprises and organisations to be inadequately prepared for a DF
investigation. This often leads to inappropriate actions being taken
after an IT security incident has been detected. DFR deals with the
adequate preparation of an organisation for a possible DF investiga-
tion through the development and implementation of specific DFR
measures. That ensures that a DF investigation can be carried out
in a targeted manner. For this, two objectives are pursued. The first
goal is to conduct an DF investigation as efficiently as possible. The
second goal is to find good traces and at the same time minimise
the costs for an DF investigation [16].
Antwi-Boasiako and Venter [2] have developed a theoretical model
to assess the admissibility of evidence. Their work proposes a har-
monised framework for assessing digital evidence admissibility
and to ensure the cross-jurisdictional acceptance and usability of
digital evidence. Key technical and legal requirements are identi-
fied, combined and integrated within the framework for assessing
digital evidence admissibility. Without the exact weighting of the
impact of the individual criteria, the model shows that integrity
verification in particular is an important factor for admissibility.
How data came to its current state can be described by using data
provenance. It logs the origin of the file and all activities performed
on it. This mechanism is already used in forensics or secure au-
ditable logging. The idea of using data provenance is not new,
but with the introduction of CamFlow an approach was found to
integrate this mechanism with acceptable resource consumption
into current systems [12]. CamFlow is the practical implementa-
tion of the whole-system provenance concept of Pohly et al. [14].
This whole-system provenance is a kernel-level provenance sys-
tem which leverages the Linux Security Modules (LSM) frame-
work guaranteeing completeness. CamFlow facilitates LSM which
records how data has been transformed and information has been
exchanged within a system through system calls. It is a flexible,
efficient and easy to use provenance capture mechanism on oper-
ating system level. Beside other provenance systems operating on
application or workflow level, this provides a provenance capturing
between processes and enables a holistic view about what action
occurred on the system [12].
CamFlow consequently implements the concept of a provenance
monitor on kernel level in order to meet the requirements of a refer-
ence monitor concept [1]. A holistic mediation, tamper-proofness,
and verifiability is given. The provenance history is also complete
if an attacker is active on the system. This kernel module produces
as an output, a provenance graph which is an extended version of
the W3C PROV Data Model (PROV-DM) [3]. A provenance graph
is a directed acyclic graph representing the execution within a
system with vertices expressing states of kernel objects and the
relations shows the information flow between those objects [12].
This concept provides the basis for the approach presented here.
The objective of our study is to carry out detailed DF analysis in
combination with IR using provenance data.
As stated by Pasquier et al. in [13] the mechanism for monitoring
the information flow control with provenance-like data acquisition
can meet requirements from the system audit. Thus, the transforma-
tions performed on the system to a file can be verified transparently
while remaining trustworthy.
The application of CamFlow was evaluated by Han et al. [9] in the
context of IT security. The application of data-provenance captur-
ing was used for the detection of attack vectors in an intrusion
detection system. The approach of Han et al. considers the use of a
provenance graph to differentiate between normal and malicious
activities for the detection of an attack. The opportunities and chal-
lenges of this approach provide the theoretical basis for the work
presented in this paper.
Existing approaches also extend to the area of IR, but important
requirements for the IR to ensure that the digital evidence can be
used in a court of law, are not taken into account. We therefore fo-
cus on the usability of the traces, which may have occurred or been
modified during an IR. A concept for the differentiation between
compromised traces and untouched traces is the key contribution
of our work.
3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Technical measures for conducting a DF investigation include the
provision of sufficient and appropriate capacity to store digital ev-
idence. The digital evidence must be stored in such a way that it
is secure from unauthorised access by third parties and retains its
original condition. A common procedure for securing the data on
a hard disk is, for example, the creation of an entire image of this
data. This data can be stored as an exact copy of the original data
on an external storage medium. Usually, a so-called write-blocker is
used in such situations, to ensure that the data is not manipulated
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by transmission or forensic analysis. [6]
In addition to the actual user data, this also applies to the metadata
of a file, such as the time of access. The documentation of the Chain
of Custody is also an important component. This is the complete
traceability of the evidence, i.e. who had access to the data at a
certain point in time [4].
An attacker can also be active during an IR. In this situation it is
common that reciprocal actions occur. The attacker is repelled and
tries several other ways to penetrate the system. In this process, the
attacker can also make mistakes and, in the optimal case, valuable
evidence for criminal prosecution can arise. The usability of such
evidence should not be compromised by the fact that during the
attack an organisation was actively defending their system with IR
measures and has potentially corrupted or destroyed evidence [17].
The concept presented here is intended to supplement existing mea-
sures of DF investigations. After an incident has been detected, a 1:1
image of the systems can be created and used for further analysis.
Our concept needs be implemented and prepared in advance as a
precautionary DFR measure. In addition, a whole-system prove-
nance capturing mechanism for the affected system and the systems
for the execution of IR measures need to be installed before. The
aim is to trace and understand IR related alterations on evidence
and separate them from potentially emerging new evidence.
3.1 Application of data-provenance in incident
response
Data provenance enables obtaining a more detailed and structured
history of interactions of digital objects within a system. This was
applied in areas such as system auditing and computational sci-
ences. This concept can be used to acquire a holistic IR related view
of system executions. To realise this, two provenance graphs from
the attacked system and the system which performs IR activities
needs to be acquired simultaneously. By an appropriate previous
installation of CamFlow this just has to be activated on the attacked
system in the event of an incident. A corresponding mechanism to
extract the provenance data is already included in CamFlow. The
client for the analysis must also be prepared accordingly. The graph
of the attacked system is the super-set of all activities performed
since the incident has been detected. The second graph of the IR
system is a detailed record of all internal performed actions to miti-
gate the attack and to restore the system. As mentioned before, the
proposed concept in this paper is an extension and not a replace-
ment to common DF procedures where a forensically sound image
of a system is created on a certain point of time.
Our concept pursues two objectives. The first goal is to track IR
actions associated with the object under investigation. The second
goal is to enrich the IR actions performed with context information
about the activities performed. For the tracking of the actions it
is assumed that IR actions are executed exclusively via a prepared
IR client and the communication to the host is done via a TCP/IP
connection. For the cross-host tracking of the actions using whole-
system data provenance, payload data within the provenance graph
is used. The recording of context information of the IR is done by a
textual recording of the tasks and the capturing of the respective
start and end time. As a result, a section of the provenance graph is
given higher meaning. In order to store and reuse this information
(text description and provenance graph) a flexible assignment is
necessary. This is required since the IR tasks differ from case to
case. Nevertheless, this requirement can be addressed as follows:
Given two provenance graphs, G1(V1,E1) of the IR related system
andG2(V2,E2) of the infected system, a sub-graph detection can be
performed. The comparative analysis of networks is a major topic in
computational and integrative systems biology. Therefore, existing
solutions from this discipline were used and adapted for forensic
application. In [11] an algorithm and a tool for computing inexact
solutions to the maximum common edge sub-graph problem for
two or more graphs is presented. This algorithm is able to detect
not just fully conserved edges but also partially conserved edges
and is applicable to any set of directed or undirected, simple graphs.
Given the possibility to relax the restrictions for the detection of
common paths between two graphs and the existing practical imple-
mentation this approach has been chosen and adapted as described
in the following paragraphs.
Since provenance graphs have vertexes and edges with a set of at-
tributes (and not a single type attribute), combined with a varying
number of such attributes, this has to be considered for detecting
sub-graphs. Our approach therefore incorporates the cosine simi-
larity into the comparison. This measure was used because it can
handle missing attributes between two elements, irrespective to
their magnitude. In addition, a threshold t has been introduced
which determines the maximum divergence. The similarity of two
vertexes, converted into two n-dimensional vectors (x and y), can
be defined as:
cos(x ,y) = x · y| |x | | · | |y | | (1)
The two graphs G1(V1,E1) and G2(V2,E2) are isomorph if there
exists a bijective function f : V1 → V2 such that there is an edge
(u,v) in E1 if and only if there is an edge (f (u), F (v)) in E2 with
the condition cos(V1,V2) ≥ 1 − t . Given a set of two graphs X =
G1(V1,E1),G2(V2,E2), the determination of the number of edges
that is isomorphic to the sub-graph of the first graph inX . Therefore,
the alignment A as a set of injective functions is defined as follows:
A = fi : V1 → Vi |1 ≤ i ≤ 2 (2)
where f1(v) = v for all v ∈ V1. Given the alignment A, one can
compute the number of edges conserved between G1 and G2.
f (A) =
n∑
u,v

i f (fi (u), fi (v)) ∈ Ei∀i ∈ [1,n]
and cos(V1,V2) ≥ 1 − t ,
otherwise .
(3)
A provenance graph is a directed graph with edges indicating a
one-way relationship. Therefore in this graph the sum have to run
over all ordered pairsu,v whereu,v ∈ V1 andu , v . The algorithm
of [11] is also capable to process un-directed graphs, but this will
not be further discussed here due to the fact that this is not relevant
for the use case of this paper. The given formulation of the (multi-)
MCES problem builds the basis for finding an alignment A of two
provenance-graphs by calculation f (A).
3.2 The underlying conceptual model
The previously described approach provides an extension of exist-
ing DF approaches. Instead of creating a system image after the IT
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security incident has become known and before initiating IR mea-
sures, a whole-system provenance capturing mechanism is initiated.
This is done for the infected system (System 1) as well as the system
that repels the attack (System 2). Provenance data is generated by
both systems. A comparison engine can determine which paths of
the provenance data interact with each other and detect similarities.
The proposed concept also collects the context information, such as
textual description of the applied IR measures, during IR and stores
it together with the provenance data in a database.
This makes it possible to provide data about any transformation
on data (respectsysively digital evidence) for use in a DF investiga-
tion. For example, the removal of malware or the closing of ports
can be documented and justified in a transparent manner by the
conformity of provenance paths. This finally leads to an enriched
description of digital evidence. In addition to the initial 1:1 image,
these can be used to gain further insights into the incident in rela-
tion to the differentiation to IR measures in court. The interaction
of these components for the application of the concept is shown
in the figure 1. The key element for the approach presented here
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the concept.
is the following of a provenance graph from the IR system to the
effected system and the inclusion of context information from IR.
To synthesise IR related tasks, the algorithm for determining two
sub-graphs of [11] as a basis for the formal description of the project
is adapted. The differentiation of IR measures and the activities of
an attacker is a result of the path tracking and the consequential
differentiation to remaining data transformations on the effected
system.
As stated in [9] analysing dynamic, attributed graphs is not a trivial
task. Especially the separation of normal and malicious activities
is challenged to detect changes by attributed vertices and edges.
These changes can occur both structurally and in labels. In particu-
lar, provenance graphs usually contain at every vertex and edge a
set of attributes [9]. These sets can vary by attack vector and the
application of IR measures.
By incorporating this algorithm it is possible to utilise the desir-
able aspect of similarity detection. The difficulty in comparing two
provenance graphs can be overcome with the flexible approach
which can tolerate minor perturbation. This means that the simi-
larity of two graphs can be determined without accepting strong
out-liners from a changed subset of attributes in the vertex and
edge.
4 PROTOTYPICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CONCEPT
A prototypical implementation of the approach has been performed.
Therein a mechanism for the simultaneous acquisition of typical IR
measures and the object under investigation using CamFlow was
initially carried out. As described in [12] a cross-host provenance
capturing is possible if the data is post-processed. This has been
done and it was possible to demonstrate a possible application.
For storing the provenance data from the investigated object and
the IR system, Neo4j1 was chosen as a suitable database. Neo4j is an
open-source, NoSQL database and is capable to store and process
graphs provided in JSON format. Additionally, a HTML-based user-
interface for recording IR activities (e.g.: update firewall rules or
reset admin rights) has been added. Due to the usage of timestamps
according the start and end of IR tasks an association between the
textual IR task description and a sub-graph of the provenance data
is possible.
Afterwards, the data was extracted from the database and imported
into an existing prototype2 to visualise the provenance graphs. This
is shown in figure 2. The prototype uses a web-based implementa-
tion of Cytoscape3. This allows the extraction of the converted data
of the provenance-date as a network for Cytoscape and to import it
into the native implementation of Cytoscape for further analysis.
System 1: Subject of investigation System 2: Incident response PC
Figure 2: Provenance-based interaction between affected
system and incident response computer.
To apply the concept, both graphs (from System 1 and System 2)
were loaded separately into the prototype and exported as a Cy-
toscape network. Then, both graphs were loaded into the software
Cytoscape and a sub-graph detection was performed.
5 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO A USE
CASE
This section describes a possible application of the proposed concept
of a data provenance-based IR handling to increase the credibility
of digital evidence acquired during an IR.
The RUAG "Melani" case [8] was chosen as a baseline for the use
1https://neo4j.com/
2https://camflow.org/demo
3https://js.cytoscape.org/
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case. The RUAG report was prepared by the Swiss government
CERT. We used it because both architecture structures were de-
scribed in detail. The attacker’s approach, the evidence left behind
and the IR approach were described in detail so that the major steps
could be repeated. Four containers were created for the experimen-
tal setup. For two of these containers the conventional IR is carried
out and for the remaining two, the IR is carried out according to our
concept. All containers were configured identically. Each container
was equipped with a Linux OS, a relational database, a firewall
with default configurations and various files classified from unim-
portant to important. This was done to create an infrastructure
for simulation regular business operations. Every login via SSH is
documented in the firewall logs. For the databases three users were
created, the admin-user with all rights, a user with read and write
rights and a user with read rights only. No changes were made to
the handling of log files of the database.
The attackers infrastructure includes a command and control server,
three tier one server proxies, and three tier two server proxies. This
is an identical structure as described in the RUAG case [8].
The experimental attack is divided into two phases. In the first
phase the attacker obtains comprehensive rights and installs a mal-
ware. In the second phase the data is examined for relevance. The
download of the data (from the infected system to the attacker) is
initially started with a low download rate and increased continu-
ously to prolong the time until detection.
First phase: After installing the malware, the target system was
scanned for information about possible accounts and user rights.
After the attacker identified a suitable account, the account was
attacked using key loggers and fake mails. The goal was to iden-
tify username and password. After obtaining this data, the firewall
settings of the system were changed. This included opening ports
to guarantee permanent access as well as preparing for the down-
load of data. Furthermore, the firewall logs were altered in order
to conceal traces. The rootkits mentioned in the RUAG report [8]
were not used to evaluate the basic concept presented in this paper,
since no kernel information was manipulated. Log files that record
data traffic were also altered, so that all suspicious data was deleted
from the logs and the attacker additionally ensured future data to
be redacted automatically by leaving a script in the system.
Second phase: During this phase, the attacker used the access rights
obtained in phase one. The purpose of this step was to examine the
target system and to find relevant files and database entries. These
were tagged according to their level of importance, to ensure they
would be included in the file download. The latter was designed to
load all data tagged as highly relevant at a low download rate. After
retrieving the important data, the remaining data is downloaded at
a much higher rate, therefore increasing the risk of being caught.
This strategy ensures that traffic analysis does not result in a rise
of the IOC.
To make the data collected during the experiment more compara-
ble, the test setup was regularly stopped at important points and
appropriate response mechanisms initiated. When applying IR pro-
cedures on the first two containers, evidence was obtained without
considering DF requirements. At the same time, a forensic image
of the situation was created for future analysis. Among the actions
initiated by the IR team was the closing of the firewall ports and
resetting them to default values as well as deleting any suspicious
software. The deletion was done without checking which software
was installed and how it worked. Therefore an analysis of the log
files for suspicious data points must be done without having a deep
knowledge of the malware.
The analysis approach described in the above paragraph describes
the current state-of-the-art IR procedure and does not include soft-
ware or concepts of the solution of this paper.
In the first experimental setup wherein the malware is installed
and user rights obtained, the process was stopped and the IR was
carried out. All further traces may have been compromised by IR
actions. Although there was evidence that something was altered
in the system and there was no data in the log files that could be
tracked or used to distinguish between IR and the attacker.
In the second trial setup, the attack was not detected until the
download reached a critical value. As an immediate measure, all
ports were closed and reset to default. Since the attacker still had
access to the system, the ports were reopened and the download
was restarted. After another peak in the download rate, another IR
measure was performed. This resulted in the closure of all ports,
without allowing them to be reopened. Also, the user administra-
tion was reset and all accounts deleted except admin access. The
attacker had no more rights and no access to the system. Suspi-
cious software was now removed without analysis of its area of use.
The log files and firewall files were checked for suspicious entries
without additional software support. As a last step the ports were
released one after the other and DNS filters were implemented.
In this case, the IR destroyed most of the data or prevented the
occurrence of new evidence.
The remaining containers, on which the concept presented in Sec-
tion 3 were applied. The data from the first test setup on the first
two containers, is used here as a basis for comparison. The IR is
carried out on the basis of the previously explained concept and the
consideration of data-provenance. Log files created by the CamFlow
were not altered. These log files cannot be adapted as easily, by
changing the data since the signature would have been corrupted.
In contrast to the previous containers, data-provenance capturing
was implemented on the attacked target system and the IR com-
puter. This enables the actions taken for the mitigation of the attack
can be distinguished from the actions of the attacker.
After a forensically-sound image of the affected system has been
created, the target system and an IR system were equipped with a
whole-system data provenance capturing mechanism. In both sys-
tems, the provenance data was extracted into a Neo4j database. In
addition, the actions of the IR team were recorded via a simple web
interface. After the execution of the IR measures a second foren-
sically sound image was created. The collected provenance data
of both systems were loaded into Cytoscape and processed with
the adapted CytoMCS algorithm aiming to match data-provenance
sub-graphs. After applying the sub-graph detection algorithm, an
aligned network was created. In the underlying data of this network
a juxtaposition of the nodes is given so that a connection between
the graphs can be obtained.
6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In the test setups it was shown that the different approaches have
advantages and disadvantages. In the first test run the aim was to
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restore the system to a working state as quickly as possible and
no further measures were taken to secure the evidence during the
IR. The utilisation of evidence is not guaranteed due to this cir-
cumstance. The evidence is destroyed or no longer meaningful due
to the alterations made during IR. Law enforcement based on this
evidence is therefore not possible.
In the second experimental setting, the proposed concept with data-
provenance was applied. Here it was shown that time has an impor-
tant influence. Equipping an IR system with the additional software
presented in this paper takes a significant amount of time. Creating
an image of an entire system also takes a significant amount of time.
The evaluation of the traces is not possible in a single application.
Thus, in the first test setup according to the concept, the data was
evaluated several times to identify the suspicious data points. After
documenting the evidence, it had to be compared to the original evi-
dence. The aim of the concept is to show that the evidence has been
altered in a controlled and comprehensible manner by IR related
analysis. If evidence have been modified by IR, this can be easily
understood with the concept. Even with the sub-graph detection
method an expert needs to check and verify these. Nevertheless, a
complete analysis with the tool requires a complete knowledge of
the systems used. This means that all affected systems of the attack
as well as the IR systems used must be known and equipped with a
data-provenance capturing method. Without this step, the overall
view of the incident and the systems used could be missing and
wrong conclusions could be drawn.
The evaluation of the graphs provides a valuable insight into the
DF analysis of an incident and new evidence created during the IR
procedure could be used for law enforcement.
The security of the presented concept is based on the assump-
tion that the integrity of the system is guaranteed at run-time and
features of using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are used by
CamFlow. Checking for installed rootkits on the system is still nec-
essary during the application of our concept in order to guarantee
the conclusiveness of the traces.
Furthermore, the attacker may recognise that a provenance cap-
turing mechanism has been installed on the infected system and
therefore behave differently based on this information.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
If an attack on information systems is detected, an IR is initiated.
This pursues different objectives than a DF investigation. While
IR aims for the quick restoration of systems, DF aims to acquire
evidence that stands up in court. With data provenance the trans-
formations on a file can be traced from its data source to its present
form. CamFlow, a whole-system provenance capturing module
which facilitates latest kernel features of Linux builds the baseline
for our approach presented here.
The proposed concept shows how the activities of an IR can be
distinguished from countermeasures of the attacker using data
provenance capturing. The provenance graphs of two systems are
generated simultaneously, compared and enriched with IR related
context data. This has the advantage that not only a forensic image
can be used at the time before the IR, but also evidence that has
arisen during the mitigation of an incident.
We have shown in the use case that an incident can cause some
problems and the initiated IR can compromise or even destroy evi-
dence. An application of the proposed concept can overcome these
issues and provides an enhanced credibility of the digital evidence.
The present concept provides the basis for a profound integration
of whole-system data-provenance capturing into the handling of
incidents. Nevertheless, the concept presented needs to be further
evaluated. The determination of the threshold for determining the
similarity of two vertexes must be further refined and the applica-
tion of the model must be discussed with law enforcement experts.
A further research project is the application of the concept to sys-
tems which cannot be forensically acquired within a reasonable
time. The use of whole-system provenance would enable a simulta-
neous IR with data acquisition for a DF investigation. This makes
it possible to track all changes made during the period of evidence
acquisition.
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